We discuss supervisory control of probabilistic discrete event systems in this paper. Supervisors for such systems will take probabilities of event occurrences into consideration in making control decisions. The essential idea is that, when some undesirable behaviors have small probabilities of occurring, the supervisor will not try to avoid such behaviors in order to allow more desirable behaviors. If the undesirable behaviors do occur, the supervisor will issue reset commands to re-initialize the system as soon as possible. We introduce a new concept called \ -containment of a given language" and subsequently study its algebraic properties. We discuss standard supervisor (with only enablement/disablement) synthesis problems and reset supervisor (with recovery mechanism) synthesis problems for both fully observed and partially observed systems. We also provide an example to illustrate the results.
Introduction
In standard supervisory control (SSC) of discrete event systems (DES) 17] 11] 13], the control objective is usually to design a supervisor such that the behavior of the supervised system is con ned to a given \legal" (language) speci cation. Such a control objective is very reasonable if the constraints on the supervised system is \ hard " , such as those used in a nuclear power plant or a space craft. In those cases, we will take no chance and tolerate nothing.
However, not every constraint we encountered in daily life is such a \hard " constraint. If we view every constraint as absolute, then we may end up achieving very little due to the existence of uncontrollable and unobservable events 7] . In terms of supervisory control, this means that the supervised system may generate a very small language. Hence, although we wish the supervised system will stay within the legal speci cation, we often take chances and tolerate some \illegal" behaviors.
This idea has been extensively used in engineering practice. For example, in Lucent Technologies' 5ESS telephone switching system, due to the high incoming rate of requests, it is always possible that the queue will over ow and some processes will have to be aborted 1]. A better design is the one which gives smaller probability of queue over ow. Another example comes from hardware veri cation problem 4], in which a fault tolerant circuit is designed such that for any given function, the circuit would produce the correct result with prespeci ed probability.
Although probabilistic automata 16] 15] have been studied by researchers for many years, their introduction to discrete event systems is a relatively new event. In 14] 8] 19] 3], di erent ways to introduce probability to discrete event systems are proposed. The idea of tolerating some undesirable behaviors in supervisory control was rst proposed in 7] . Using probability to specify what is tolerable was rst presented in 12] .
In this paper, we further develop the idea presented in 12] and show that the knowledge of the probabilities of event occurrences in the plant can be taken into account in designing a supervisor which can achieve more than the SSC supervisor can do while at the same time guarantee that the probability of the supervised system violating the legal speci cation is no greater than a given tolerance level . This can be most conveniently accomplished by introducing a new concept called -containment. We say that a language M is ancontainment of the legal language K if the probability that a string in the language K will be continued to a string in the language M but outside the language K is less than or equal to . Clearly there may be more than one -containment of K. We would like, if possible, to nd the largest one that can be realized by a supervisor. We also require that the supervisor has a proper recovery mechanism to recover after the legal speci cation is violated. The recovery should be made as soon as possible.
For this approach to work, we need to introduce two new features in the SSC. The rst one is the probabilities of event occurrences. This is rather straightforward (see, for example, 3] 8]). The second feature is a recovery mechanism of the supervised system after the violation of the legal speci cation (which is now possible although with probability less than ). We will use reset (re-initialization) as the recovery mechanism. Notice that reset action is a common tool used in practice. Because reset is a forceful event, standard supervisory control theory, which can only deal with enablement and disablement of events, is no longer suitable here. Therefore, we will use the generalized supervisory control framework proposed in 10].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the relevant results of supervisory control in the generalized framework. We introduce the probabilistic discrete event systems in Section 3. We will also discuss the -containment of a given language and its properties in Section 3. We then study, in Section 4, the existence of SSC supervisors for probabilistic DESs. In Section 5 we present an algorithm for computing the maximal closed and controllable sublanguage of L(G) which is an -containment of the given speci cation langauge K. In section 6 we introduce reset event into the model. We further show how to design a reset supervisor for this class of discrete event system models. We use one practical example to illustrate the results in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section we brie y review some basic results of supervisory control 17] 11] 13] in the generalized framework proposed in 10].
The plant to be controlled is described by a (deterministic) automaton G = ( ; Q; ; q 0 ) with elements de ned in the usual way 17]. Since we do not consider blocking issue in this paper, we assume all languages are (pre x) closed unless otherwise stated. The language generated by G is denoted by L(G). A (partial observation) supervisor is an enablement map : PL(G) ! ? where ? 2 is the set of control patterns and P : ! o is the projection from the event set to the observable event set o . That is, after observing a string s2PL(G), the supervisor enables the set of events (s). Formally, the language generated by the supervised system =G, denoted by L( =G), is de ned as follows.
(1) 12L( =G), where 1 denotes the empty string; and Q ! 0; 1] assigns a probability of occurrence to event at each state q 2 . Thus, de nes the probability of occurrence of in L(G) after the occurrence of s:
We make the following assumptions on the probability distribution.:
A 1 An event is feassible if and only if it has nonzero probability of occurring: is de ned at each state q unless there is no feasible transition at q (i.e., for all 2 , ( ; q) is not de ned.) In order to guarantee that is de ned for all q 2 Q, it is required that L(G) be deadlock-free 9].
This can be done easily by employing algorithms in 9]. Details on how to obtain deadlock-free languages are omitted in this paper.
A 2 The probabilities of event occurrences in a sublanguage K L(G) is proportional to those in L(G): For all s 2 K and 2 K (S),
The above de nition can be easily extended to strings: P K ( 1 2 : : : n j s) = P K ( 1 j s)P K ( 2 j s 1 ) : : : P K ( n j s 1 : : : n?1 ):
To consider supervisory control problem for probabilistic DESs, we need to introduce -containment. Suppose K L(G) is the desirable closed loop language, i.e., K is the language representing some \soft" constraints as given in the speci cation process. Due to the existence of uncontrollable events, the supremal controllable sublanguage of K may be too small to be acceptable (in the sense of SSC 17]). Since the constraints are \soft", we will consider the supervisory control problem by allowing violations of the constraints as long as the probability of such violations is small. Therefore, we would like to nd a language M( L(G)) such that if the supervised system stays within M, the probability of violating K is no greater than a given tolerance threshold . Formally, we give the following de nition.
De nition 4 Given an
In words, if M is an -containment of K, then as long as the system stays within M, the probability of violating K is less than .
Remark 1 Although in the de nition of -containment only one-step transition probability is used, it captures the essence of the problem. First, if the speci cation is given in terms of legal and illgal states as in 18] 3 , it is only important to examine the probability of transitions from a legal state to an illegal state. Secondly, if the probability of becoming illegal after the next event is less than (P M ( j s) < ), then the probability of becoming illegal after any string of events is also less than ( P M ( t j s) P M ( j s) < ) (see
Theorem 3).
In the sequel we use the notation M K to represent that M is an -containment of K. -containment has the following useful properties:
Property 1 -containment can be viewed as a generalization of sublanguage:
Elementary.
However, in general, M K implies neither M K nor M K as shown in the following example.
Example 1 Consider the PDES G described in Figure 1 , where the notation a(x) represents that event a occures with a probability x. For a language L, L denotes the pre x closure of L. Let M = (a 1 (a 2 + a 4 a 5 )) , K = (a 1 (a 2 + a 3 )) . The corresponding probabilistic distributions of the events are computed according to assumption A 2, as also shown in 
From Assumption A 2 in section 3, we have, for any given s 2 K,
as well. Hence M 1 K.
We now give an example to show why it is necessary to assume that K \ M 1 = K \ M 2 for the above property to hold. Example 2 Consider a PDES shown in Figure 2 . Suppose that M 2 = L(G).
a5 (1) a6 (1) a7 (1) a8 (1) K a1 (1) a4 (1) a5 (1) M1 a1 (1) a2 (1) a6(1) The transition diagrams of M 1 ; M 2 , and K are also shown in Figure 3 . Now, let = 2 9 , it is not di cult to nd out that both 
SSC Supervisor
In this section, we consider the rst part of control design, where control is achieved by standard enablement and disablement. That is, we study the SSC supervisor e : PL(G) ! ? e that will consider the probabilities of event occurrences and will take chances in order to achieve more legal behaviors. Such a supervisor can be designed based on -containments.
In other words, if L( e =G) is an -containment of K, then the probability of the supervised system violating the legal speci cation in any future time is less than . 
Assume L( e =G) K. Let's consider, for any s 2 K and n 1, the set B(s; n). If B(s; n) = ;, then obviously P t2B(s;n) P L( e=G) (t j s) = 0 . Otherwise, all traces t 2 B(s; n) can be written as u v, where u; v 2 and is the rst event violating the legal speci cation: su 2 K^su 6 2 K.
Some of the traces in B(s; n) may share common pre xes u or u . For those share the common pre x u , clearly P t2B(s;n)^u t P L( e=G) (t j s) = P L( e=G) (u j s) 4 . For those share the common pre x u, we write them as u 1 v 1 , u 2 v 2 , . . . , u l v l . Then X t2B(s;n)^u t P L( e=G) (t j s)
For two traces x and y, x y denotes x is a pre x of y, and x < y denotes x is a strict pre x of y. Let us rst consider full observation supervisors. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 CE(K) is closed under intersection but not under union. Proof:
It follows from Proposition 1, Property 5, and Example 2.
Therefore, the supremal element of CE(K) may not exist. We can only nd maximal elements of CE(K), called the maximal controllable containments of K. After nding a maximal element maxCE(K), we can design a supervisor such that L( e =G) = maxCE(K):
This supervisor will allow the supervised system to have maximum freedom while the probability of violating the legal speci cation is no greater than 5 .
For partial observation supervisor, we have the following proposition. 5 An alternative way to design a supervisor is to view maxCE(K) as the \tolerable behavior" and K as the \desirable behavior" and use the approach of 7] . Since this approach is standard, we will not discuss it further.
Proposition 4 COE(K) is closed under intersection but not under union.

Proof
It follows from Propositions 2 and 3.
Again, the supremal element of COE(K) may not exist but we can nd its maximal elements denoted by maxCOE(K). We can design a supervisor such that L( e =G) = maxCOE(K):
Algorithm to Compute maxCE(K)
In this section, we will develop an algorithm to compute maxCE(K). Algorithms to compute maxCOE(K) are more complicated and will be discussed elsewhere.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the automaton G K generating K is a subautomaton of G, in other words, G K = ( ; Q K ; K ; q 0 ) where Q K Q and K = j Q K is the restriction of on Q K . We will denote such a subautomaton as
where Q ? Q K is viewed as the set of illegal states.
In order to compute maxCE(K), we rst identify the set of boundary states of G K as Q bound def = fq 2 Q K : (9 2 ) ( ; q)!^: K ( ; q)!g where \!" stands for \is de ned" and \: " means \not".
The states in Q bound will be classi ed as \good" and \bad". A state q is bad if the probability of going to illegal states via all uncontrollable events is greater than , that is
Such bad states, denoted by Q bad , should be removed from G K , along with all states in Q K that can reach Q bad via some uncontrollable string s 2 uc , which is denoted as Q bad .
Since the removal of Q bad may change the condition (1), the above procedure must be repeated until convergence. Denote the resulting automaton as G (1) K .
After removing all these bad states, the resulting language is an -containment of K. However, it may not be maximal. To achieve maximality, we next add transitions ( ; q) = q 0 and q 0 , where q 2 Q bound ? Q bad and q 0 2 Q ? Q K , to G (1) K as long as such additions do not violate the -containment. That is 0 2 G (q)? G K (q) ( 0 ; q) + ( ; q) 0 2 G K (q) ( 0 ; q) + ( ; q) (2) Clearly such additions are not unique and hence maxCE(K) is not unique. Denote the resultant automaton as G (2) K .
Finally, denote the states in the resulting G (2) K but not in the original Q K by Q new , and those remaining boundary states as Q rem bound . Then the maximal controllable containment of K is given by
where < Q new Q rem bound > G (2) K are all the strings in L(G (2) K ) that ends in a state in Q new Q rem bound .
Formally, we present our algorithm as follows. 
Remark 2 The three steps 18-20 are simply for the purpose of unifying the notations with those used preceding the algorithm.
We have the following theorem concerning the algorithm.
Theorem 4
The above algorithm computes one of the maximal elements in maxCE(K).
Proof:
We give an outline of the proof.
Suppose the output of the algorithm is some language K max . Obviously K max is closed. It is an -containment of K because the condition (2) and the negation of (1) are satis ed. It is controllable because we have removed all states that can reach Q bad via uncontrollable events. It is also maximal because we have added every transition at Q bound as long as -containment is not violated.
Reset
Since it is now possible for the supervised system to violate the legal speci cation, we must introduce a recovery mechanism when the speci cation is violated. Reset is the simplest recovery mechanism and is widely used in engineering practice. Therefore, we will discuss reset in this section.
We rst expand the original system to a system with reset functions. Although it is best to be able to reset at any state, due to some practical constraints, we may have limited reset ability, namely, reset is possible only at certain states.
Let G be the original plant. Let G r = ( frg; Q; r ; q 0 ; Q r ) be the plant with reset mechanism added, where ; Q; q 0 are the same as before; r is the reset event, which we assume to be observable; Q r denotes the subset of states at which reset is possible; and r : ( frg) Q ! Q is de ned as The language generated by G r is L(G r ). We also denote the set of strings in L(G r ) after which G r can be reset as L r (G r )=fs 2 L(G r ) : r (s; q 0 ) 2 Q r g: Language L r (G r ) is not closed unless Q r = Q.
To extend the supervisor e to G r , let us de ne, for all s 2 L(G r ), the \fresh" of s to be fresh(s) = the longest su x of s whose constituent events belong to :
Then, we can extend e : PL(G) ! ? e to r : PL(G r ) ! ? r ;
where ? r = fg frg : g 2 ? e g, as follows. r (s) = (fresh(s)) frg:
That is, after each reset, r will disable the same events as e , starting from fresh. r =G r therefore describes the supervised system after introducing the reset event.
We are now going to synthesize a reset supervisor f that will force a reset whenever necessary. f can be viewed either as a supervisor for r =G r f : PL( r =G r ) ! ? f or as a supervisor for G r which is then conjuncted with r . These two viewpoints are equivalent, that is f =( r =G r ) = ( f^ r )=G r . We should take the rst viewpoint.
Note that the criterion for designing f is di erent from that for r . For f , we do not want it to generate as large a language as possible, but rather, we want it to force a reset as soon as possible, after the legal speci cation is violated.
Under full observation, f : L r (G) ! ? f can be designed as follows. Under partial observation, f may not have su cient information to decide when to force r (i.e., the desired f may not exist). To see this, let's check the following example.
Example 4 Let L(G) and K be shown as in Figure 4 . Suppose a 3 is not observable. Then P(a 1 ) = P (a 1 a 3 ). Hence strings a 1 and a 1 3 have the same status of resetting. However, it is obvious that when a 1 occurs, we do not need to reset the system. On the other hand, if a 1 a 3 occurs, we need to reset the system. So ambiguity arises due to the existence of unobservable events. In order to avoid such ambiguity, we need to impose more conditions on the associated languages. A su cient condition for f to exist is that K is normal.
Assuming With both e and r in place, our supervisory control design is completed.
Example
Consider a simpli ed model of the distributed robot control system described in 2] 5]. A processor is used to process the readings of two sensors for the robot in order to generate control signals.
The transition diagrams of sensor 1, sensor 2 and the overall system are shown in Figure 5 . Notice that the events a; b; c stand for \apply for using the processor", \ use of the processor", and \release of the processor". Suppose sensor 1 is a frequent user of the processor while sensor 2 rarely uses the processor. For example, sensor 1 reads, as in sampled data system, the speed of the robot in a xed rate. Sensor 2, on the other hand, sends in warning signals when the robot is close to some obstacles.
The process of reading from sensor 2 has priority over that of sensor 1. The control objective is to avoid the simultaneous occupation of the processor by the two sensors. That is, the legal language K is the language of the resultant automaton by removing the bad state (2,2) from the overall state transition diagram. The minimally acceptable behavior is that both sensors can use the processor. Since sensor 2 has priority over sensor 1 in using the processor, their associated events (a 2 ; b 2 ; c 2 ) are not controllable (in the sense of SSC). In order to control the system e ciently, the controller has control over event a 1 (apply for using the processor by sensor 1) and b 1 (use of the processor by sensor 1). Namely, c = fa 1 ; b 1 g. Now we add some probabilistic features to this system. Suppose we have that 8s 2 L(G), P L(G) (a 1 ; b 1 ; c 1 j s) = 0:95 and P L(G) (a 2 ; b 2 ; c 2 j s) = 0:05. The complete probability DES plant is also shown in Figure 5 (see the numeric numbers after the event names in the transition diagram of L(G)).
First we consider the SSC design. It can be shown that the supremal closed and controllable sublanguage of K " = (L(G) ? f(2; 2)g) " = (a 2 b 2 c 2 ) does not satisfy the minimal requirement of allowing both sensors to use the processor. Therefore, SSC will not work and we will use our approach to solve the problem. The resultant automaton is shown in Figure 6 .
Finally, Q new = (2; 2), and maxCE(K) = L(G ? (2; 1) ? (1; 2) ? (2; 2)) (< (2; 2) > < (1; 2) > < (2; 1) >) G K \ L(G)
Correspondingly, the SSC supervisor will act according to the following decision rules:
e (s) = ( K (s) if (s; q 0 ) 6 = (1; 2) fc 2 g otherwise We now expand G to G r . Suppose Q r = f(2; 1); (1; 2); (2; 2)g. According to our discussion in section 6, we can nd the reset controller as follows: The nal closed loop system is shown in Figure 7 . Following Figure 7 , the system works in the following way. First, both of the sensors can use the processor. This is re ected by the existence of strings (a 1 b 1 c 1 ) and (a 2 b 2 c 2 ) in the closed loop language. Second, sensor 2 has priority over sensor 1. Indeed, when a 2 b 2 is followed by a 1 , b 1 is disabled and sensor 2 will continue to use the processor. Third, once the undesired situation arises due to the simultaneous occupation of the processor by the two sensors, the controller will simply reset the system to the initial state.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a supervisory control methodology for probabilistic discrete event systems. By using this method, we can, with certain tolerance level, enlarge the achievable closed loop behavior. Reset has been used as a recovery mechanism once the system goes out of the desired region. Synthesis problems for both disablement/enablement supervisors and reset supervisors are discussed. We believe that the method presented in this paper will nd applications in engineering practice, as tolerating bad behaviors of small probability is a common practice. 
